Giddens Lecture

Giddens Lecture 2/12/05

Bourdieu and Habermas are examples of Agency-Structure Intergration

We are going to have a look at another example of this: Anthony Giddens and his Structuration Theory.

(quote 1)

“the problem of structure and agency has rightly come to be seen as the basic issue in modern social theory” – Margaret Archer, Culture and Agency.

“[Dealing with the agency-structure problem] has become the ‘acid test’ of a general social theory” – Margaret Archer, Culture and Agency.

Even though there are many differences between sociological theory in Europe and the US – we could say that this Agency-Structure problem seems to be something that they strongly have in common.

This concern for agency-structure is at the core of the work of a number of social theorists:

(quote 2)

Bourdieu – Habitus and Field

Habermas – Life-World and System

Burns – Social Rule-System Theory

Lukes – Power and Structure

Abrams – Historical Structuring

Touraine- Self Production of Society

Crozier and Friedberg – Game Theory Approach

Giddens – Structuration Theory

Handout: References.

We have been looking at the overcoming of binary oppositions in philosophy and in social theory – before we go on to look at Giddens’s Structuration Theory – I would like to talk about the micro-macro binary – it is often called in Anglo-American social theory and how this relates to the binary known as agency – structure in European social theory.

At one level these two sound similar – and in a lot of theory they are often treated as if they are similar.
Margaret Archer has argued that the structure/agency problem connotes a concern for micro-macro relationship – as well as – she argues – a concern for voluntarism-determinism and subjectivism-objectivism.

This seems fairly reasonable – if we make the association of the micro with agent and the macro with structure.

However – there are other ways of thinking of both micro/macro and agent/structure that make the differences more distinct.

While agency does usually refer to the macro level – agency can also refer to (macro) collectives that act.

For example:

Burns: sees human agents as including “individuals as well as organized groups, organizations and nations”

Touraine: focuses on social classes as actors.

If we accept collectives as agents – then we can’t automatically equate agency with micro-level phenomena.

Also: while structure usually refers to large-scale social structures – it can also refer to micro structures such as those involved in human interaction.

Giddens’s definition of systems (which is closest in meaning to structure – closer than his own meaning of structure) suggests both kinds of structures because it involves: “reproduced relations between actors or collectives”.

Micro often means conscious creative actor – but it also mean a more mindless behaver of interests to behaviorists.

Thus: both agency and structure can refer to either micro-level or macro-level or to both.

Giddens

Giddens’s Structuration Theory is one of the best known theories that tries to integrate agency and structure.

Giddens first starting introducing this theory in the 1970s – but it really wasn’t until his book – The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Agency – that theory appears in its most developed form.

Giddens goes as far to say in this book:




(quote 3)

“Every research investigation in the social sciences or history is involved in relating action to structure … there is no sense in which structure ‘determines’ action or vice versa” – Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society.

“Men make history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past” – Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works.

While Giddens is not a Marxist – there is a strong Marxian influence in The Constitution of Society – Giddens even sees it as a extended reflection on Marx’s inherently integrative idea (quote 3).

However, Marx is just one of the many influences that go into Structuration Theory – in fact, Giddens has analyzed and critiqued most major theoretical orientations and has used many of the useful ideas in them.

Therefore: Structuration Theory is incredibly eclectic - (not restricted to one source of ideas – but choosing from a wide range)

Giddens looks at a social theories that begin with the individual/ agent (symbolic interactionism) or society/structure (structural functionalism) – and rejects both of these popular approaches.

Instead: Giddens suggest that we begin with recurrent social practices.

(quote 4)

“The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of social totality, but social practices ordered across time and space” Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society. pg. 2

All social action involves structure.
All structure involves social action.
Agency and structure are inextricably interwoven in ongoing human activity or practice.

At the center of Giddens Structuration Theory – with its focus on social practices – is a theory of the relationship between agency and structure – the theory is intended to show the duality and dialectical interplay between theory and structure.

Agency and structure cannot be conceived of apart from each other – they are two sides to the same coin.

Giddens’s starting point is human practice – and the important point is that Giddens means that these practices are recursive.

In other words:

(quote 5)

“[activities are] not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents produce the conditions that make thses activities possible.” – Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society.

Structure is reproduced in and through the succession of situated practices which are organized by it.

Similarly with consciousness: The human actor, in being reflexive, is not merely self-conscious but is also engaged in the monitoring of the ongoing flow of activities and structural conditions.

Giddens deals with the agency/structure issue in a historical, processual, and dynamic way.

What Giddens is saying here is that practices are not created by human consciousness – or by the social construction of reality – nor are the being produced by social structure – rather by expressing themselves as actors – people engage in practices – and it is through practice that both consciousness and structure are produced.

But not only are the social actors reflexive – but also are the social researchers who are studying them.

This point brings us to Giddens’s well-known ideas on the double hermeneutic.

Both social actors and sociologists use language.

Social actors use language to account for what they do – and sociologists use language to account for the actions of the social actors.

Thus: Giddens thought that is was very important that we were concerned about the relationship between lay and scientific language.

Especially – Giddens thought that we should be aware that the social scientist’s understanding of the social world may have an impact on the world they are studying and thus lead to distorted finds and conclusions.

But let’s look at Giddens’s Structuration Theory in a little more detail:

(quote 6)

Actors continually monitor their own thoughts and actions as well as their physical and social contexts.

Actors develop routines that enable them to efficiently deal with their social lives.
Actors are motivated act – these motivations involve wants and desires that prompt action.

While development of routines and reflexivity are continuously involved in action, motivations can be thought of as possibility for action. Motivations provide overall plans for our action – but most of our action – Giddens claims – is not directly motivated.

In the realm of consciousness – Giddens makes a distinction between discursive consciousness and practical consciousness:

(quote 7)

Discursive Consciousness – being able to put things into words.

Practical Consciousness – that which is done by actors – without them being able to say in words exactly what it is they are doing.

It is Practical Consciousness that is most important to Structuration Theory – because of its focus on what is being done rather than what is being said.

This focus on Practical Consciousness shows itself clearly in the move from agents to agency – the things that agents actually do.

Giddens gives a lot of weight to agency (his critics say too much) – Giddens tries very hard to separate agency from intentions – because many times what actually happens is NOT what was intended – intentional acts have unintentional consequences.

This idea of unintentional acts plays a large role in Giddens’ Structuration Theory – and it important to get us from agency to the social system level.

Giddens gives the agent a lot of power – for Giddens agents have the ability in the social world.

For Giddens – agents make no sense without power – the actor stops be an agent if she looses the ability to make a difference.

Giddens sees that there are constraints on actors – but this does not stop them from choices that make differences.

To Giddens power must be prior (before) subjectivity – because action involves the power to transform the situation – thus, Structuration Theory accords power to the actor and action.

This idea is in opposition to theories that locate the power in the intent of the actor (phenomenology) and other theories which locate the power in the external structure (structural functionalism).

The conceptual core of Structuration Theory lie in the concepts of :

(quote 8)

Structure

System

Duality of Structure


(quote 9)

“[Structure is defined as] he structuring properties [rules and resources] … the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them systemic form.” Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society.

Structure is made possible by the existence of rules and resources. Structure themselves do not exist in time and space. Rather, social phenomena have the capacity to become structured.

“structure only exists in and through the activities of human agents.” – Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology.

“In my usage, structure is what gives form and shape to social life, but it is not itself that form and shape.” – Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology.

Giddens offers a very unusual definition of structure – it does not follow the Durkheimian idea of structure as being external to and coercive over actors – Giddens makes a point that structure is NOT OUTSIDE or EXTERNAL to actors.

Giddens does not deny that structure can constrain action but he thinks that most sociologists and social theorists have exaggerated the importance of constraint.

Furthermore: they have failed to show that structure is always both constraining and enabling – structures enable actors to do things that they would otherwise be unable to do

Habermas Lecture

Habermas Lecture 25/11/05

Habermas has a huge reputation amongst some social theorists, psychologists, philosophers.

One of the best places to start thinking about Habermas is by looking a the two theorists central to second wave Critical Theory – they are Karl Marx and and Sigmund Freud – we will start with looking at Habermas in relation to Marx.

Habermas says:

(quote 1)

“to develop a theoretical program that I understand as a reconstruction of historical materialism” – Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society

“[the problem in Marx’s work] is the reduction of the self-generative act of the human species to labor” – Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests

“I take as my fundamental starting point the fundamental distinction between work and interaction” – Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society

Throughout his writings Habermas looks at this distinction – but he mostly uses the terms: purposive-rational action (work) and communicative action (interaction).

Habermas takes Marx’s species-being “sensuous human activity” as his own starting point.

Habermas argues that the mistake Marx makes is to not distinguish between work (purposive-rational action) and social (or symbolic) interaction (or communicative action).

Habermas thinks that Marx ignored the later (interaction) and reduced it to work.

(quote 2)

Purposive-rational action

Instrumental action - concerned with a single actor rationally calculating the best means to a given goal.

Strategic action – involves two or more individuals coordination purposive-rational action in the pursuit of a goal.

The object of both instrumental and strategic action is instrumental mastery.



Habermas, of course, was most interested in communicative action:

(quote 3)
“the actions of the agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding. In communicative action participants are not primarily orientated to their own successes; they pursue their individual goals under the conditions that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions” - Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society. [italics added]

Whereas the end of purposive-rational action is to achieve a goal, the objective of communicative action is to achieve communicative understanding.

It is important that this communicative action not be reduced to only speech acts or nonverbal expressions – though there is obviously a strong speech component.

Habermas’s most radically departure from Marx is to argue that it is communicative action and NOT purposive-action (work) that is the most distinctive and persuasive human phenomena.

According to Habermas, Communicative action is the foundation of all sociocultural life and well as the human sciences.

Therefore – where Marx focused on work – Habermas focuses on communication.

So Marx critiques work – and he uses as his baseline work that is free and creative.

In the same way – Habermas critiques communication – and his baseline is undistorted communication, communication without compulsion.

Habermas is concerned with those social structures which distort communication – just as Marx examined the structural sources of the distortion of work.

The VERY important thing to note here is that although Habermas and Marx have different baselines – they both have baselines.

These baselines are what make judgments possible – and this is how they escape relativism.

Habermas is very critical of earlier critical theorists who did not have these baselines – especially Weber – and accused them of lapsing into relativism.

There is another parallel between Habermas and Marx and their baselines – these baselines are not only there analytical starting points, but also there political objectives.




For Marx: a communist society in which undistorted work would exist for the first time.

For Habermas: a society of undistorted communication.

Habermas and Marx’s immediate goals might be expressed like this:

For Marx: the elimination of (capitalist) barriers to undistorted work.

For Habermas: the elimination of barriers to free communication.

It is here - that Habermas (in his book; Theory and Practice) – like other Critical Theorists – turns to Sigmund Freud – and sees many parallels between what psychoanalysts do on an individual level – and what he thinks needs to be done on a societal level.

Habermas sees psychoanalysis a theory of undistorted communication and as trying to help individuals communicate in an undistorted way.

So just as the psychoanalysis seeks to find the distortions in individual communication and tries to help the individual overcome these blocks – in the same way therapeutic critique – “a form of argumentation that serves to clarify systematic self-deception” – the critical theorist tries to help people overcome barriers to undistorted communication.

Habermas believes that there are elements of undistorted communication to be found in every act of contemporary communication – in much the same way as Marx believed that there were elements of species-being to found in the work in capitalist society.

Now let’s look at the notion of rationalization and Habermas – it here that Habermas is influenced by not only Marx’s work – but also, of course, by Max Weber’s.

In Habermas’s notion of rationalization – Habermas’s distinction between purposive-rational and communicative action remains important.

Habermas believes that most theorizing has focused on the rationalization of purposive-rational action – which leads to a growth of productive forces and an increase in technological control over life.

It is this form of rationalization which is a major – probably the major problem – for Marx and Weber – in the modern world.

But for Habermas it NOT rationalization that is the problem – but what is being rationalized.

For Habermas the problem is the rationalization of purposive-rational action - not rationalization in general

In fact, Habermas the solution to the problem of the rationalization of purposive-rational action is the rationalization of communicative action.

The rationalization of communicative action leads to communication free from domination – free and communication.

Rationalization here means removing restrictions on communications.

At the social level – such rationalization would mean a decrease in normative repressiveness and rigidity – leading to increases in individual flexibility and reflectivity.

This less restrictive or nonrestrictive normative system is at the heart of Habermas’s theory of social evolution – the end point being a more rational society.

Again: rationalization, for Habermas, leads to a new, less distorting, normative system – a system where the barriers that distort communication have been removed – but more importantly:

(quote 4)

A communication system in which ideas are openly presented and defended against criticism; unconstrained agreement develops during argumentation.

Habermas makes a distinction between communicative action and discourse – communicative action happens in everyday life, whereas discourse:

(quote 5)

“[discourse is] that form of communication that is removed from contexts of experience and action and whose structure assures us: that the bracketed validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or warnings are the exclusive object of discussion; that the participants, themes, and contributions are not restricted except with reference to the goal of testing the validity claims in questions; that no force except that of the better argument is exercised; and that all motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded.” – Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (pgs. 107-108)

The notion of Habermas’s discourse is the “ideal speech situation” – in which force or power does not determine which arguments win out; instead the better argument wins out.

This is very important: The arguments that emerge from such a discourse (and the participants agree on) are true – thus, Habermas adopts a consensus theory of truth rather than a copy theory of truth.

As Thomas McCarthy says in his book on Habermas:


(quote 6)

“The idea of truth points ultimately to a form of interaction that is free from all distorting influences. The ‘good and true life’ that is the goal of critical theory is inherent in the notion of truth; it is anticipated in every act of speech” – Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas.

(quote 7)

Consensus arises theoretically in discourse (and pretheoretically in communicative action) when four types of validity claims are raised and recognized by the interactants:

(1) The speaker’s utterances are seen as understandable, comprehensible.

(2) The propositions offered by the speaker are true; that is, the speaker is offering reliable knowledge.

(3) The speaker is being truthful in offering the propositions; the speaker is reliable.

(4) It is right and proper for the speaker to utter such propositions; she or he has the right to do so.

Consensus arises when all these validity claims are raised and accepted; it breaks down when one or more are questioned (for example, questioning the right of the speaker to utter certain propositions).

There are – remember – Habermas claims – forces in the modern world which would distort this process – prevent the emergence of a consensus – and would have to be overcome for Habermas’s ideal society to come about.

Jurgen Habermas: Colonization of the Life-World

Habermas has developed his theory further – especially using a wide number of sociological theorists – George Herbert Mead, Talcott Parsons, Alfred Schutz, and Alfred Durkheim.

Habermas’s most recent ideas could be broadly thought of as Colonization of the Life-World.

We will look at what Habermas means by: colonization, life-world, system.

What must be remember is that Habermas’s main theoretical concern remains communicative action – free and open communication remains his baseline and political objective – in fact, Habermas’s interest in the colonization of our life-world’s is the way in which this colonization adversely affects free communication.



Life-World

The concept is drawn, obviously, from phenomenology – particularly the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz.

For Habermas the Life-World represents the internal viewpoint – while system represents the external viewpoint.

Habermas: “Society is conceived from the perspective of the acting subject.”

Habermas view Life-World and Communicative Action as complementary concepts.

More specifically communicative action can be seen as occurring within the life-world.

(quote 8)

The lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world … and where the can critize and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements” – Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason.

The lifeworld is “a context-forming background of processes of reaching understanding” through communicative action – it presupposes a mutual understanding.

Habermas is concerned with the rationalization of this lifeworld – which involves increasingly rational communication in the lifeworld.

The lifeworld includes: culture, society, and personality (Parsons).

Engaging in communicative action in each of these leads to the reproduction of the lifeworld through reinforcement of culture, the integration of society, and the formation of personality.

Rationalization in the modern world means the “growing differentiation between culture, society, and personality”

System

System involves the external aspect: “from a observer’s perspective of someone not involved”.

Each of the major components of the lifeworld has a corresponding element in the system – cultural reproduction, social integration, and personality formation take place at the system level.

System has its roots in the lifeworld but develops its own structural characteristics: family, judiciary, state, economy – these structures evolve and become more distant from the life world.

Rationalization increases this differentiation at the systems level.

As these systems grow they, also, develop more controlling power over the lifeworld – they also have less to do with developing consensus and in fact limit that process.

Social Intergration and System Intergration

Taking this into account, Habermas concludes that:

(quote 9)

“The fundamental problem of social theory is how to connect in a satisfactory way the two conceptual strategies indicated by the notions of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ - Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason.[italics added]

Habermas goes on to contrast the increasing rationality of system and life world – the rationalization of the lifeworld leads to more communicative action – it is freed from normative constraint and is able to achieve mutual understanding more and more.

A more and more rationalized system however: restricts communication and “unleashes systems imperatives that burst the capacity of the lifeworld that they instrumentalize”.

A violence which produces pathologies in the lifeworld – Habermas links many of these deformities to systems in capitalism – however, Habermas abandons this Marxian approach because he forced to admit that: “[the pathologies] are no longer localizable in any class specific ways” – showing, perhaps, in the end his stronger influence by Weber.

Colonization – the rationalization of the system comes to triumph over the rationalization of the life-world, with the result that the life-world comes to be colonized by the system.

Bourdieu Lecture

Bourdieu Lecture 17/11/05

There is a kind of theme running though the ideas and philosophers that we have looked at so far – and that is a sort of overcoming of binary opposition.

The next theorist that we will look also tried to overcome some of the binary oppositions which he saw operative in social theory or sociology.

Pierre Bourdieu was born in the south of France in 1930.

As part of his military service Bourdieu had to teach in Algeria – it was there that – Bourdieu who was teaching philosophy previously - became interested in anthropology and sociology after some exposure to colonialism in Algeria.

The main thrust of Bourdieu’s work is a critique of the false oppositions that have shaped theoretical thinking about the social world.

Bourdieu is particularly keen to break down the opposition of subject and object – or objectivism/subjectivism .

As Bourdieu puts it: “the most steadfast (and, in my eyes, the most important) intention guiding my work has been to overcome the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism.”

This stance is presented in his early 1970’s essay: An Outline of a Theory of Practice.

In this essay Bourdieu outlines two, and ultimately three, levels of theoretical knowledge:

(quote 1aa)

First Level: Primary Experience (or the phenomenological level)

This level is known to all social researchers as the source of their basic descriptive data about the familiar, everyday world – either of their own society or of another.

Second Level: ‘Model’ or ‘Objectivist’

Here knowledge constructs the objective relations (e.g., economic or linguistic) which structure practice and representations of practice.

Boudieu’s theorizing is an attempt to overcome this opposition between subjective and objective knowledges.

Bourdieu introduces a third level of theoretical – kind of theoretical knowledge that focuses on the objective and structural knowledge but at the same time examines the practices of actors at the center of subjective theoretical knowledges.

Bourdieu’s uses some particular conceptual terms in his work to overcome this opposition between objectivism and subjectivism in theory. They are:

(quote 1a)

Habitus

Field


Bourdieu thinks that Durkheim (and his social facts), the structuralism of Saussure and Levi-Strauss, and the structuralism of Marxism.

(quote 1)

Objectivism

Durkheim

Saussure

Levi-Strauss

Marxism

Subjectivism

Phenomenology

Ethnomethodology

Symbolic Interactionism


Bourdieu critiqued both theoretical approaches

(quote 2)

Objectivism

Focus on the objective structures while ignoring the process of social construction by which actors perceive, think about, and construct these structures and then proceed to act on that basis.

In other words, objectivist theoretical approaches ignore agency and the agent.
Instead, Bourdieu tries to focus on structure without losing sight of the agent.


Subjectivism

Focuses on the way in which agents think about, account for, and represent the social world while ignoring the social structures in which these processes exist.

In other words, subjectivist theoretical approaches concentrate on agency while ignoring structure.

Instead, Bourdieu focuses on the dialectical relationship between objective structures and subjective phenomena.

(quote 3)

“On the one hand, the objective structures …. form the basis for … representations and constitute the structural constraints that bear upon interactions: but, on the other hand, these representations must also be taken into consideration particularly if one wants to account for the daily struggles, individual and collective, which purport to transform or to preserve these structures.” – Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power.” in Sociological Theory 7:14-25

To overcome this objective-subjectivist problem – Bourdieu employs the concept of practice – this is seen as the outcome of the dialectical relationship between structure and agency.

Practices are not objectively determined nor are they the product of free-will.

Bourdieu labels his own theoretical orientation: constructivist structuralism.

Bourdieu follows a basic structuralist approach – but it is a different kind of structuralism than Saussure or Levi-Strauss or structural Marxism –in that while they focus on structure and language – Bourdieu argues that structures also exist in the social world.

(quote 4)

Constructivism - the view that our knowledge of the world is the product of social practices, or of interactions between social groups.

Structualism – any analysis that emphasizes structures and relations. It is the view that the social phenomena are not physical objects, but objects with meaning, and that their signification must therefore be the focus of analysis.

Bourdieu tries to bridge the gap between constructivism and structuralism – and it is generally agreed that he succeeds to some degree – he does lean more toward the structural side – it is for this reason that Bourdieu and Foucault are both categorized as poststructuralists.

Bourdieu’s constructivism is unlike the constructivism of – for example, phenomenologists and symbolic interactionists – in that Bourdieu ignores subjectivity and intentionality.

(quote 5)

Bourdieu does think that it important: to include the way in which people – on the basis of their position in the social space – perceive and construct the social world.

However: the construction that happens in the social space is constrained by structures.

We can describe what Bourdieu’s theoretical interest as: the relationship between social structures and mental structures.

Bourdieu theoretical work is the effort to bridge subjectivism and objectivism using the concepts of habitus and field.

While habitus exists in the mind of the social actors – fields exist outside their minds.

Habitus

Habitus is the concept for which Bourdieu is probably most famous for.

We are unconscious of habitus, yet it manifests itself in the day-to-day practices: the way we walk, talk, eat, or even blow our noses.

(quote 5a)

A specific habitus becomes clear when a range of things (occupation, education, income, artistic preferences, taste in food, etc) are shown, statistically, to correlate with each other. Thus, the professor of law will tend to have had a private school education, prefer J.S. Bach, have a high income, and prefer a simple, if elegant, diet of lean meats, fresh fruit and vegetables. This correlation is what Bourdieu says constitutes a specific (in this case, bourgeois) set of dispositions, or a habitus. A habitus is a set of dispositions common to a class.

(quote 6)

Habitus are the “mental, or cognitive structures” through which people deal with the social world. People have internalized schemes through which they perceive, understand, and appreciate, and evaluate the social world. It is through such schemes that people both produce their practices and perceive and evaluate them.

A habitus is acquired as a result of a long term occupation of a position within the social world.

We can think of habitus as internalized social structure.

We can think of habitus as both being produced and producing the social world.




(quote 7)

“[habitus is] the dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality” – Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice.

“[habitus is] the disposition of structured and structuring dispositions which is constituted by practice and constantly aimed at practical … functions.” - Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice.

It is practice that mediates between habitus and the social world – it is through practice that habitus is created – and it is as a result of habitus that the social world is created.

While habitus constrains thought and choice of action – it does not determine them.

It is lack of determinism which makes Bourdieu other than strictly structualist.

Habitus “suggest” what people should think and what they should choose to do. The habitus provides principles by which people make choices and how they use those choices within their social worlds.

Field

Another important term for Bourdieu is “field”.

There are a number of ‘fields’ in the social world – some examples are: artistic, religious, economic.

(quote 7)

‘Field’ – is a network of relations among objective positions within it. These relations exist apart from individual consciousness and will. They are not interactions or intersubjective ties among individuals. The occupants of the positions may be either agents or institutions, and they are constrained by the structure of the field. Each field has its own specific logic and all generating among actors a belief about the things that are at stake in a field.

Bourdieu sees the field as an arena of struggle. Individuals and collectives see to safeguard or improve their position.

The field is a kind of competitive marketplace in which various kinds of capitial (economic, social, cultural, symbolic) are used.

Explain: cultural capital

The positions of various agents in the field are determined by the amount of relative weight of the capital they possess.

Bourdieu even uses military imagery to describe the field:


(quote 8)

[Field is] an arena of strategic emplacements, fortresses to be defended and captured in a field of struggles. – Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste.

Bourdieu is concerned with the relationship between habitus and field – the field conditions the habitus – whereas the habitus makes up the field as something that is meaningful, that has sense and value and that is worth an investment of energy.

Applying Habitus and Field

it is important to understand that Bourdieu does not want to just develop an abstract theory and that the other half of his project is applying this theory to empirical concerns.

In his book Distinction:

High and Low culture.

Anthropology looks at both.

B. links tastes for refined objects with taste in basic food flavours.

Taste – helps to unify those with similar preferences – and to differentiate those with different tastes.

Though ‘taste’ people differentiate between objects and therefore classify themselves.

Two interrelated fields involved in ‘taste’:

Class relations and culture relations

These fields are played like a game.

However, social class profoundly effects one’s ability to play this game – the higher social classes are better able to have their tastes accepted and to oppose the tastes of the lower classes.

B. sees culture as a kind of marketplace or economy – where they utilize cultural capital rather than economic capital.

This capital is largely a result of people’s social class origins and their educational experience.

What they drink –
What newspaper they read –
What car they drive – Mercedes: gain Volkswagen: Loss

Changes in cultural products result in changes of taste – and visa a versa.

Field (cultural products) and habitus (taste) – it is a dialectical relationship where each conditions each other.

Changes in taste result from a struggle between opposing forces in both cultural (old fashion vs new fashion) and the class (dominant vs dominanted) arenas – however, B. says the main struggle is in the class arena and that the cultural struggle is secondary.

So a cultural struggle between artists and intellectuals may be a reflection of struggles going on between factions within the dominant class.

The important thing to see is that B. gives a lot of importance to class struggle – but does not reduce it to merely economic concerns – but sees class as defined by habitus as well.

In as sense B. work can be seen as a return to the Marxian concern between theory and practice.

Derrida Lecture

Derrida Lecture 11/11/05


Derrida’s first well-known book was a translation of Husserl’s Origin Of Geometry – this was well-received by French academic circles – but his subsequent work has been less well-received – most of his teaching has been done in American universities – although usually not in the philosophy departments – but in literature departments – until his death less than six months ago.

Derrida presents himself – not so much as a practitioner of philosophy, but as an assiduous reader – he is a remarkable reader – with a real talent for close, subtle, and imaginative readings of variety of texts.

Derrida has done close readings and studies on philosophers from:

Plato
Rousseau
Condillac
Hegel
Marx
Husserl
Heidegger
Levinas

And essays literary figures, such as:

Kafka
Valery
Mallarme
Joyce
Artaud
Blanchot

And from the human sciences:

Freud
Saussure
Levi-Strauss

Probably more than any other philosopher since the Middle Ages – Derrida has devoted himself to reading and commenting on the writing of others.

Reading Derrida can be very frustrating.

Derrida seems to particularly irritate and upset some philosophers in the analytic tradition, such as John Searle (Limited Inc.)– and many other philosophers, theorists, and thinkers regard Derrida as a obscurantist charlatan – I hope in this lecture today help to disprove the noun – but have to admit there is something to the adjective.

Derrida discusses difficult thinkers at a high level of sophistication – Derrida also uses a variety of writing styles – puns, bizarre associations, etc – simply as a way in which to knock us out of ordinary conceptual categories – he is NOT trying to make things easy for us!

One key to appreciating Derrida is to realize these writing styles are not failed efforts to construct or analyze arguments – but that the stylization itself is part of his argument.

Sometimes you wonder though – is there any purpose to the immense length and complexity of some of these stylistic displays?

I would say that even Derrida’s most difficult books offer rewards if you persist with them.

I would also say that ultimately that Derrida’s concerns are ethical – and even Gnostic – and a kind of negative theology – in the last years of his life, Derrida’s philosophy was more and more concerned with religion – particularly the Judeo-Christian tradition.

It is quite extraordinary how Derrida begins by analyzing writing and how it does or does not carry meaning and this eventually becomes an inquiry into how to experience of the divine.

Deconstruction

I would like to begin – as a way into Derrida’s philosophy – with the idea he is probably most commonly associated with – deconstruction.

Let me first say this: as a sort of guide to what we are about to explore together –
two worlds = metaphysics – the privileging of one world as real and one world as less than real – to give the less the real world meaning – idealism as Nietzsche means it – Derrida now examines the way in which this kind of metaphysics operates to allow us to believe that we have stable meaning – especially in the philosophical dichotomies between writing and speaking – this is what we are going to look at now.

The first question we should ask ourselves is: Why should a philosopher like Derrida be so obsessed with what others have written?

It is because – as Derrida sees it – human thought and its limitations are revealed in writing.

(quote 1)

A written text will always escape total clarification.

There are always textual ambivalences that remain unsolvable and prevent us from understanding what the author really means.

Let’s look at the main idea that Derrida uses throughout his philosophy:

We might think as Plato did that the problem is writing – if we could talk to the author – ask him what he or she really meant – then all undecidability would be cleared up.

Even if we have the author in front us – differences in past experience, expectations, idiolect – means permanent possibilities of misunderstanding are not cleared up.

Even our thoughts are not unambiguous even to ourselves – according to Derrida – there is no pure presence of thought to self – all thought is mediated through language – there is always a difference between what is thought (or experienced or said or written) and the ideal of pure, self-identical meaning.

Cat exercise – meaning cannot be nailed down.

This is the argument that Derrida repeatedly demonstrates in all his books : that the contingent and remediable defects of writing are also the defects of thinking – but not only thinking all expression, and even all reality.

Let’s look at this in more detail …

In the search of total clarity – philosophers since Plato have insisted on a sharp distinction between speech and writing.

Speech is primary – writing is secondary and derives from thought.

When someone speaks to me directly there is not much chance of misunderstanding.

But when I read the source is absent – thus there are more opportunities for misunderstanding.

eg. viva voce.

Derrida shows how thinkers from Plato to Rousseau and Saussure have implied that writing is less than speech – and in doing so have used all the philosophical dichotomies (dividing things or ideas into two groups that are opposed because completely different).

Speech: presence, reality, truth, certainty, purity
Writing: absence, appearance, falsehood, doubt, impurity.

Very Important Point: But Derrida claims that in the very texts in which Plato, Rousseau, and Saussure put speech over writing – they are constantly reversing the distinction – putting writing before speech – putting writing in the primary position.

Plato describes thought – which speech is supposed to be a pure expression of - as a “as a kind of writing inscribed on the soul.”

Plato also says that for all it dangers that is the only way that speech can be preserved – this is why Plato refers to writing as pharmakon – that which means poison and remedy.
Rousseau – while denouncing the deceptions of writing – say that writing – rather than speech is the only way in which he can express his true self.

Derrida calls the studying the role of writing in Western thought – grammatology.

Even though we are constantly failing to attain perfect meaning and truth – all our philosophy is based on the idea that such perfection is possible.

This striving to perfectly capture meaning (in speech or writing) in philosophy is formulated in three principles:

Ex: Hinayana (written) and the Mahayana (spoken):

(quote 2)

The effort to perfectly capture meaning in philosophy is formulated by Derrida by three principles (logocentrism or logocentric thinking):

(1) Principle of Opposition

Basic elements of thought and language are pairs of opposing concepts:

presence/absence; truth/falsity; being/nothingness; same/other; one/many; male/female; hot/cold, and many, many, more.

(2) Principle of Logical Exclusion

These pairs are regarded as logical alternatives – governed by:

The principle of identity (A =A)

The principle of non-contradiction (nothing can be both A and not-A)

(3) Principle of Priority

Each fundamental pair is asymmetrical in that one term has priority over the other (e.g. more fundamental, more real, morally better, etc.)

This is the structure of the metaphysics that seemingly keeps meaning stable and fixed.

When Derrida does a reading he tries to reveal the ways in which the text has to break this model.

Derrida will show how the binary oppositions are not sustained (as in the examples given of Plato and Rousseau) - and relations of exclusion and priority are denied by the very text that formulates them.

This technique Derrida calls deconstruction.

Derrida gets this from Heidegger’s destruction. Being/being. Ontic/Ontological.

(quote 3)

Deconstruction shows how texts based on binary oppositions themselves violate both the principle of exclusion and the principle of priority. Thus, a deconstructive reading of a text reveals points at which it introduces one of the opposing terms into the definition of the other or reverses the order of priority of the two terms.

This general project of deconstructing the fundamental dichotomies built into thought yields a critique of logocentrism.

(quote 4)

The dominant terms always correspond to some sort of presence, a reality that is positive, complete, simple, independent, and fundamental (Plato’s forms, Aristotle’s substances, Aquinas’s God, Hegel’s absolute Geist). This presence is always understood as the polar opposite of something that is negative, incomplete, complex, dependent, and derivative.

Derrida’s deconstructive readings show that this purity and priority of presence (logocentrism) can never be sustained.

It is important to note that deconstruction is not just reversing the priorities – that would be, as Derrida has said, logocentrism in another key – in other words, it is a critique of the metaphysics of presence – regardless of what takes the dominant position of ‘real’ presence.

How is this ethical?

Ethically – deconstruction reveals that values considered eternal truths are merely historically developed and contingent practices of certain cultures. This effects a critique of ethnocentrism.

A particular form of ethnocentrism that Derrida has focused on (and other philosophers like Luce Irigaray) is phallocentrism.

Phallogocentrism presents masculine ‘traits’ as obviously superior to the feminine ‘traits’ (eg. domination over sympathy, clarity over depth) – and the notion that social and political subordination of women is completely natural and appropriate.

My epistemological earthquake.

Derrida thinks that phallocentrism is derives from logocentrism so speaks of phallogocentrism,




Difference

In addition to his deconstructive readings, Derrida has created vocabularies in which tries to sketch/adumbrate out that level – which might be called preontological ­– where dichotomies dissolve and their oppositions reverse and slide into each other.

Derrida has created three vocabularies that he uses in attempting to render this preontological level, they are:

(quote 5)

differance – to differ and to defer

supplement

trace

We will look first at the one Derrida has most fully developed and most often uses: ‘difference’.

“differ” refers to way in which any one of the binary pairs fail to match the domain to which it is supposed to apply – i.e. Rousseau’s use of the concepts speech and writing does not correspond to the sharp division he claims to make between them.

(quote 6)

‘differ’ (different) – any pair of binary opposites always to fail to match exactly the phenomena to which it supposed to apply.

There is a difference between Rousseau’s use of the concepts and the sharp division he claims to make between concepts (speech and writing).

or:

There is always a difference between the structure of an actual phenomenon (historical event, a text, a personality) and the binary divisions required by a logical system.


‘defer’ (to put off) – any effort to impose sharp distinctions required by the binary oppositions must be “put off” (deferred) in the face of the recalcitrance of the phenomenon”


defer – when the binary opposites fail to match with the phenomenon we could take up a another binary distinction on another level – but we ‘defer’ doing so.

Example: When we see that Plato we that has violated the speech/writing dichotomies by saying “thought is writing in the soul” – we could take up another binary position such as: “good writing/bad writing” – but even this second position can be undermined – so an attempt at sharper distinctions will have to be indefinitely deferred.

Derrida says that despite the limitations of standard dichotomies – we have no way of thinking apart from them.

(quote 7)

There is no standpoint outside of the dichotomies from which we can overlook and master them.

We can use the term “difference’ to indicate the limitations of our language but not to overcome them.

Derrida’s questioning of distinctions on which thinking is based is not undertaken in the name of a new set of definitive answers (i.e., a new set of dichotomized concepts) but in the name of the perpetual need to be aware of the limits of any answers.

Nietzsche Lecture

Nietzsche – Lecture 4/11/05

Fredrick Nietzsche (1844-1900) – between 1872 and 1888 Nietzsche published nine books.

It is by a reading of all those books – and in the order that Nietzsche suggests – that we can understand Nietzsche’s philosophy as multi-perspectivism – Nietzsche thought that best, most accurate knowledge was not trying to find the ‘truth’ of some thing or some statement –there was no ultimate knowledge which transcended all other views – but rather the collection of a lot of different views – this is reflected in his books – all the books express different viewpoints – sometimes very contradictory.

What I would like to do in this lecture is give you an overview of Nietzsche’s philosophy in relation to his most important ideas.

(quote 1a)

Anti-idealism

Nihilism

Will to Power

Re-valuation of All Values

The first thing to understand about Nietzsche is that his philosophy is radically
anti-idealist.

He rejected the notion of idea of God – and all other metaphysical substitutes for God – such as Platonic Forms or Ideas.

It is this anti-idealist stance that has attracted postmodern thinkers – Foucault.
(geneology - the inquiry into the conditions which certain perspectives have come into being – ie. evaluation and interpretation.

To begin to understand Nietzsche we need to understand the ideas of Socrates/Plato.

Nietzsche is best understood in light of the idealism of Socrates/Plato.

Explain: Platonic Forms.

The two worlds idea – for Nietzsche in Western thought there is a root idea – a main idea – which is common to Western religion and philosophy – and this idea goes back to Socrates – that idea is that the “good” or the “real” or “truth” or “God” or “Paradise or heaven” – those ideas that give human life its meaning have their source in another world – a world that transcends this one – that is better or greater than this world that we live in .

In comparison to this eternal realm or being this world is considered valueless and meaningless, even ‘evil’.
(quote 1)

Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute in ‘world history’, but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beast had to die – Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense

To Nietzsche the biggest “clever beast was Socrates: because Socrates claimed that the ultimate goal of human beings was to attain knowledge – not of THIS world - but of that world that transcends this world.

The cave metaphor.

This realm of “forms” – which are eternal, unchangeable, immaterial – this is what Socrates/Plato dialogues such as the Symposium (perfect love), Phaedrus (ideal form first mentioned) – Republic (good).

For Socrates/Plato it is through knowledge that we get to know this real world.

Nietzsche pointed to Kant as the beginning of the end of this idea – because Kant’s ‘real world’ is the noumenon – the thing-in-itself – and this can’t be known.

Explain: Kantian two-world phenomena and noumenon

Thus - even if this ‘real world’ does exists - we can’t know it – so is completely valueless and useless in determining how we should live our lives.

Suddenly with Kant the ‘real world’ cannot be known – this to Nietzsche is the beginning of the end for the ‘real world’ – or the ‘two world’ idea. – for it is after Kant comes the realization that “God is Dead” and the rise of science.

Science takes the place of religion – Nietzsche however criticizes science – because he claims that it holds on to the two-world idea by claiming that the goal of human beings is the knowledge of ‘reality’ or the ‘truth’ of things and that by knowing that ‘reality’ or ‘truth’ our lives will be better and we will be happier.

Nietzsche asks the question: Why would we believe a deeper knowledge of so-called ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ make our lives better?

This loss of a second world – were we located meaning – lead to a loss of meaning – which is nihilism.





(quote 2)

Nihilism:

Loss of all moral and religious beliefs.

Nietzsche said that nihilism was growing in the modern world and that it was a real threat and danger to civilization.

Nietzsche feared what he called a ‘nihilistic rebound’ – he worried what would happen to human society and culture if there were no response to nihilism.

He feared that European Buddhism would become very attractive.

The essence of what Nietzsche means by nihilism is clear stated in his book, Will to Power:

(quote 3)

Extreme positions are not succeeded by moderate ones but by extreme positions of the opposite kind. Thus the belief in the absolute immorality of nature, in aim- and meaninglessness, is the psychologically necessary effect once the belief in God and an essentially moral order becomes untenable. Nihilism appears at this point …because one hs come to mistrust any ‘meaning’ in suffering, indeed in existence. One interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as if every thing were in vain. – Nietzsche, The Will to Power

Nietzsche says that we should just see the idea of God or the ‘real world’ as just one interpretation.

Mankind makes up a ‘second world’ to give meaning to this world – then realizes that this second world is fictitious – made up – imagination – and because the imagine world was the basis for meaning in this world – this world looks meaningless.

This growing nihilism – this meaninglessness – and how to respond to it is at the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

To be overcome – beaten – by the meaninglessness of life is to prepare the conditions for what Nietzsche calls passive nihilism.

This is the opposite of what Nietzsche recommends are response to be – which is active nihilism.

Let’s look at the difference between these two terms in more detail.

Passive nihilism sees the world as without meaning and stops there –gives up – Nietzsche called it “tiredness of the spirit”.

Active nihilism is an increase in the power of the spirit. Active nihilism understands nihilism as a transitional stage - active nihilism is a complete nihilism in that it negates even nihilism – through taking up the opportunity to create new values.

Nietzsche and existentialism.

Nietzsche claimed that Buddhism was a passive nihilism – Buddhism sees the lack of meaning – nihilism – but takes this as the final meaning and fails to go beyond it.
in that it saw the world as without meaning – life is suffering – and that it didn’t suggest anything beyond nihilism except the complete annihilation of the individual in parinirvana.

Nietzsche accused Buddhism’s response to nihilism as being passive – but he misunderstood the response as an act of destruction of the ego/individual (as some Buddhist schools do!) rather than a re-cognizing of the always already emptiness of self – which in turn is the fullness of life – thus re-cognizing the emptiness of self is life affirmation.

passive nihilism – sees this world as meaningless, and stops there.

active nihilism – sees the comprehending of this world as meaningless as a stage in greater empowerment – affirmation – of life – or the will to power.

Will to Power

Nietzsche’s notion of the Will to Power can be seen as the basis of his anti-idealist position.

Nietzsche’s philosophy can be most clearly seen as a criticism of idealism. What it idealism? In philosophy more generally ‘idealism’ means that ideas are the only thing that are real or that we can know anything about, ie. Hegel. But for Nietzsche idealism meant any principle or idea – such as platonic forms, or a second ‘real’ world, such as we have been discussing – which is said to be the underlying truth of all the diverse facts of this world. (example: all women, all Thais, all Australians).

Any idealism has to deny exceptions and other factors to be coherent – thus, Nietzsche would say that idealism is life denying – life is not reducible to an identity – it is always a totality of differences – no an identity.

And what is life – it is the will to power.

The will to power is not an idealism – though it can look like one – ie. “an underlying truth to all the diverse facts of the world” – and some philosophers have accused it of being an idealism or metaphysical – which is another way of saying idealism.

But let’s look at what Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil:

(quote 4)

Granted that nothing is ‘given’ as real except our world of desires and passions, that we can rise or sink to no other ‘reality’ than the reality of our drives … is it not permitted to make the experiment and ask the question whether this which is given does not suffice for an understanding even of the so-called mechanical (or ‘material’) world? I do not mean as a deception, an ‘appearance’, an ‘idea’ (in the Berkeleyan and Schopenhaueran sense), but as possessing the same degree of reality as our as our emotions themselves – as a more primitive form of the world of emotions in which everything still lies locked in a mighty unity and then branches out and develops in the organic process …as a kind of instinctual life … as an antecedent form of life? – Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil

(quote 5)

There is no willing subject behind power, no reality behind the play of forces, no division into will and its other, or into being and nothingness, or into subject and object – for these divisions are themselves the movement of the will to power. The will to power is a plurality of forces, from which identities have to be constructed, not an underlying unity behind appearance. – John Lechte, Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers: From Structuralism to Postmodernity

This will to power has no origin, no purpose, no beginning, no end – because all of these are idealist or metaphysical categories. It is just life force continually organizing and reorganizing itself it to random patterning.

The Re-valuation of All Values

Nietzsche is often said to be a nihilist. In fact, as we have seen , he was trying to find a positive and life-affirming response to what he could see was the coming the nihilism he expected from the collapse of religion, idealism, and metaphysics.

He thought the most life-affirming response was – what he called; “the revaluation of all values”.

Simply – this means that now that value or meaning has collapsed – nihilism – this presented an opportunity to create new values, new ethics – but what will we create this new values upon? We can’t use God or metaphysics – Nietzsche thought these new values should affirm life – or the Will to Power.

(quote 6)

Positing as a general standard of value the attainment of a kind of life in which the will to power as the creative transformation of existence is raised to its highest possible intensity and qualitative expression. This led Nietzsche to take the “enhancement of life’ and creativity to be the guiding ideas of his revaluation of values and the development of a naturalistic value theory. – The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.

This way of thinking carried over into Nietzsche’s thinking about morality – particularly Christian morality.

Nietzsche argued that values or morality should be judged “in the perspective of life” – in other words, does this system of morality affirm and enhance life/will to power?

Nietzsche claimed that most systems of morality and ethics did not enhance life, rather they reflected “all too human” needs and weaknesses of the mediocre (the weak and mediocre are those who cannot accept life as it is – and live in resentment – the will to power)
.
Such as the Slave/Master morality of Christianity – a way in which the weak can take revenge on the strong.

The Eternal Return (or Eternal Recurrence)

Nietzsche ask the question: If you had to live you life again and again, exactly the same every time, forever, could you say “yes!”?

Presented in two ways: thought experiment and test of your ability to affirm you life without any appeal to anything (God, metaphysics) outside it.

And also: he entertained the thought that it could be literally true – if matter is limited and time is eternal – then things must repeat – like throws of a dice.

But in his philosophy – more important as a thought experiment to test one’s ability to affirm life in the face of a complete collapse of metaphysics or meaning.

“I will it thus” – in the face of suffering – to affirm life. Amor fati – love of fate.

Art makes life liveable in the face of the tragic recognition that life is ultimately unknowable as a metaphysical fact – art becomes the way not to deny life – through the principles of form-giving and intoxication – The Birth of Tragedy.

Postmodernism Lecture

Postmodernism – Lecture One

The term “postmodernism” first comes into use in architecture to describe the reaction against postwar ugly modern concrete residential tower blocks.

It has become influential in areas of study: philosophy, political theory, economics and sociology.

There are many kinds or approaches to postmodernism – we will discuss the main ones but concentrate on how the notion of postmodernism is used in sociological theory.

§ anti-humanistic – death of “Man” – the rise of humanism – Mid Ages to Renaissance to Enlightenment
§ anti meta-narratives – anti transcontextual – truths not Truth
§ loss of origins and transcendental signifiers
§ overcoming of hierarchies and vertical knowledges
§ meaning can’t be nailed down
§ multiple subjects – not sovereign subject
§

In sociology – the term ‘postmodernism’ points to fundamental changes that have happened in society that distinguish those societies from earlier ones in the modern period.

Pre-modern and modern

Many classical sociologists such as Comte, Durkheim, Weber, and Marx shared a common interest in the social changes associated with industrialization.

All of them believed that they had, or could, use scientific analysis to uncover the underlying truth of human development (called ‘metanarratives’ by some postmodernists). All thought they could identify the future direction of social change.

This faith place in science – to be able to tell us the truth of things – and the belief in science can be seen as characteristic of the movement from pre-modern to modern.

Many sociologists would suggest that in pre-modern societies – such as tribal societies - were based on religion, superstition, and tradition – and that there was little conception of change as subject to human control – instead change was seen as determined by other, non-human forces.

The Enlightenment

Modern ways of thinking are usually seen as having their origins in the 18th Century Enlightenment. The rise of autonomous reason over revealed Truth – as found in the Bible, or told to us by the Church.

David Harvey describes, on page 12 of The Condition of Postmodernity the Enlightenment in the following way:

(quote one)

Postmodernism and the Enlightenment

Many postmodern theorists claim that the Enlightenment project of the modern age has come to an end in the 20th century – many people no longer believe in the inevitability of progress, that science can solve all our problems, or even the possibility of running societies in strictly rational ways.

Many people are less hopeful about the future and do not believe that the answer can be found in grand theories or ideologies such as Marxism.

People are also exposed – through the internet and other medium - to a wide varieties of understandings, knowledges, cultures, and beliefs – and can no longer believe that the absolute truth is to be found in one set of ideas or beliefs and all others are false.

Postmodernism and Architecture

The first place – in the West – that many of these postmodern understandings were expressed was in architecture. Modern architecture used many cheap materials to mass produce housing and offices for cities.

Scientific knowledge would solve the problems of accommodation. The swiss born architect – Le Corbusier saw architecture as producing ‘machines for modern living’

(quote two)

Postmodern architects distrust the scientific approach and instead of looking to a high technology future – borrow from the past.

Postmodern theorists say this loss of belief in grand plans for the future of humanity – extends past architecture to include all areas of social life.

(quote three)

Jean-Francois Lyotard – Postmodernism and Knowledge

Ask to write something on the state of knowledge in Canada – Lyotard writes The Postmodern Condition (1984).

In it he claims that postmodern culture begins to develop at the end of the 1950s.

Lyotard sees these as related to science and technology – but most importantly, he thought to changes in language – these he called “language games”.

Lyotard saw social life as organized around these ‘language games’ – which served to legitimate peoples behaviour.

Lyotard thought that saying that anything is true or right are just ‘language games’ in which the speaker is just trying to get their version of what is true or right accepted.

Narrative

In pre-modern societies the principle language games were stories, myths, legends and tales. The narrator established his right to speak and the legitimacy of wha he is saying according to who he is. Narratives like these help the tribe convey the rules on which its society is based.

Science and Metanarratives

Enlightenment narratives are different in that ‘who’ speaks the narrative is not as important as whether the scientific claim is judged as true.

The scientist sees narrative, such as myths, stories, etc, as being backward, primitive, and ignorant.

The truth or falseness of a scientific claim is establish by other participants in the scientific language game by evidence and rational argument – these decide whether the narrative will be accepted or rejected.

However, scientific statements can not separate themselves completely from narrative. Science tries to maintain a distance between it and narrative, but it can’t absolutely.

Science itself relies on metanarratives for its meaning and motivation. Why
do science?

The metanarratives – like the idea of progress - that humans can defeat ignorance and oppression – give scientific endeveavour a purpose.

Knowledge is seen as being inherently good for human beings.

The Postmodern Era

Lyotard says that in the pomo era these metanarratives are becoming harder and harder to believe – that: reason will conquer superstition or that political change can produce a perfect society.

The postmodern era is seen as having two main characteristics:

(1) the idea of their being a Truth idea is abandoned as denotative language games are seen as relative to context.
(2) denotative language games are replaced by technical language games – pragmatism. Richard Rorty.

So a philosopher or researcher might ask what is the use or my research rather than whether it is true or not.

Knowledge and Computer Technology

Lyotard said that one of the things that postmodernism rests on is miniaturization and commercialization of machines – particularly computers. Computers have become the principle means of production.

Knowledge that cannot be translated into a form useable by computers tends to get lost or disregarded.

Economic activity is centered more and more on information technology.

Social life becomes more and more dependent on technology – internet, mobile phones, etc.

Postmodern society is based on the production and exchange of useful knowledge.

Grand theories of Truth are less important than knowledge language games which are efficient and marketable – rather than whether they serve some ultimate purpose or goal.

(quote 4)

The search for truth in modern thinking has led only to as much terror as we can take. Postmodernism offers the possibility of tolerance and creative diversity in which people are not corrupted by a doctrinaire metanarrative.

Lyotard – Critique

Lyotard indulges in performative contradictions – while attacking metanarrative Lyotard makes big statements about the direction of human development – as well as making moral assessments about its desirability.

While dismissing the idea of objective knowledge he claims that he has identified the key features of contemporary societies.

Terry Eagleton (‘Capitalism, modernism, and postmodernism’ in Against the Grain – a Marxist critic of Lyotard says that he sees nothing more than a justification for capitalism and pursuit of profit regardless of the human consequences.

Jean Baudrillard – Simulations

Baudrillard is widely amongst sociologists as the postmodernist par excellence.

The significance of Baudrillard for sociologists is his claim that the sociological idea that it is a study of a distinct domain – the ‘social’, the ‘political’, the ‘political’, the ‘economic’( Weber also cautions against the use of the terms such as ‘social’ and ‘sociology’

Signs and the Economy

Baudrillard states that society that has moved away from the Marxist idea of being based on production and economic forces – the importance of buying and selling goods has been replaced with the buying and selling of signs – BRANDING.

The Development of Signs

Baudrillard claimed that signs in human culture pass through four main stages:

(quote 5)

(1) signs represent a basic reality
(2) signs cover up a basic reality.
(3) signs cover up an absence of a basic reality – like icons may cover up the fact that God does not exist
(4) the sign has no relation to any reality whatsoever – it is pure simulacrum


(quote 6)

Simulacrum:

an image of something that does not exist and has never existed. To Baudrillard, modern society is based on the production and exchange of free-floating signifiers (words and images) which have no connection with what is signified (the things that words and images refer to).

Examples of Simulacrum

Disneyland – perfect model of a simulacrum

Not just theme parks – Los Angeles – made of stories and images that have no grounding in reality.

Power and Politics

The political implications of this are: if it becomes impossible to grasp reality through signs – then it becomes impossible to change things.

Baudrillard doesn’t think that power is distributed unevenly – power – the ability to change anything at all – has just disappeared and we are all trapped in a virtual prison – powerless to change anything at all and condemned to endlessly exchanging meaningless signs.

Baudrillard is different from Lyotard in that he saw humans as being trapped rather than being freed by the postmodernist age.

Television

Baudrillard had a lot to say about television.

Baudrillard spoke of ‘the dissolution of life into TV’ and said “TV watches us, TV alienates us, TV manipulates us, TV informs us’ – to Baudrillard it is television is primarily responsible for bring about a situation where image and reality can no longer be distinguished.

David Harvey – The Condition of Postmodernity

Harvey’s view very different than either Lyotard or Baudrillard.

Disagrees with Lyotard that metanarratives have outlived their usefulness – since he use a metanarrative – Marxism – as the basis of his analysis of postmodernism.

Puts most of the emphasis on economic factors.

Continuities and Changes in Capitalism

Harvey says that a capital system is still at the heart of contemporary Western societies. This economic system retains three basic characteristics:

(quote 7)

Capitalism is based on economic growth and is defined as being in crisis when there is no growth.

Capitalism is based on workers being paid less than the value of the commodities they produce so profits can be made.

Capitalism is dynamic. It is always producing or organizing work and technological innovation as businesses seek to get ahead of their competitors.

It is the changes in economics that causes changes in culture and society.

From WWII to about 1973 – the economy was fairly stable throughout the world – but economic problems came to a head in around 1973 – oil crisis, unemployment, profits fell, stagflation – these problems led to “different regimes of accumulation” – different ways of trying to ensure profit and growth.

This is turn was the cause of many of the cultural changes that we call postmodern.

Economic Change and Postmodernism

The change from modern to postmodern - is the change to “flexible accumulation”

He sees flexible accumulation as involving:


(quote 8)

rapid changes in labour markets, products and patterns of consumptions
more rapid technological change
increasing employment in the service sector
the reduction of trade union power
high unemployment
reduced security for workers who are expected to be flexible enough to accommodate the ever-changing demands of their employers

Patterns of consumption of products such as computer games and new services in the leisure industry have led to cultural changes.

Capitalist have succeeded in encouraging rapid shifts in fashion – ie. clothes and music.

Cultural and Social Changes

Harvey would say that it is economic change which has brought about the cultural and political changes that have been the focus of attention for theorists – such as Lyotard and Baudrillard.

Quick changes in fashion – to drive up profits –give us the difference, ephemerality, spectacle, etc of postmodernism.

Cheaper and cheaper – and faster – travel and the internet – all brought about to maintain profits – have changed the way in which people experience Time and Space – compressed it.

Thus: the sense of time and place has been weakened – I can listen to my favorite radio here in Chiang Mai – often you see places before you get there on television – ie. New York City.